When chains have good reasons to believe that their interlocutors are trustworthy, they can also not pay. For example,bitcoin history of this is the case when the Polkadot relay chain communicates with the Polkadot Statemint public interest chain. However, in general, fees are a good way to ensure that XCM messages and their transmission protocols will not be overused.
Aave is a DeFi protocol that uses a liquidity pool to provide lending services, stable interest rates and lightning loans.bitcoin exchange in dubaiIn Aave v1, the borrower pays the lender the borrowing interest rate. When users borrow assets, they need to pay 0.00001% of the loan amount as the interest rate, which is the agreement service fee. 20% of this fee will be used to provide financial support for Aave's referral program, and the remaining 80% will be transferred to the agreement. In addition, when borrowers apply for flash loans, they also need to pay 0.09% of the loan amount as expenses. 70% of this money is used by the lender, and the remaining 30% will be allocated between the recommender and Aave based on the "28%" ratio.
Uniswap's main operating income is transaction fees. In Uniswap V1, users will be charged 0.3% of the transaction value (GMV) each time they exchange tokens. Starting from Uniswap V2, the agreement splits the transaction fee of the above-mentioned "0.3% of the transaction volume", in which the liquidity provider will receive 0.25% of the transaction volume income, and the remaining 0.05% will go to UNI token holders. Someone. For V3, when adding liquidity, there are 3 levels of fee rate to choose from: 0.05%, 0.3% and 1%.Uniswap's agreement income needs to be added to V2 and V3, because the agreement fee structure of v2 and v3 is different. The income generated by Uniswap is transferred to retained earnings to maintain Uniswap's ecology and operations, or passed to UNI holders through a destruction mechanism similar to MarkerDao.Through this article, we have a deeper understanding of how agreements work and the value they generate. Next, let's talk about the role of agreement income in project analysis. Generally, agreement income can be used for asset evaluation, in a comparable analysis to assist investors in judging which projects are undervalued or overvalued. It mainly adopts three indicators: market-to-sales ratio P/S (market value to income ratio), price-to-earnings ratio P/E (market value to earnings ratio), etc. Although these indicators are not the absolute best judgment criteria, they are very helpful in comparing NFT projects of the same type.In traditional finance, the P/E ratio is the ratio of the stock price to the company’s earnings. As a measure of how many years it takes for a company to obtain its market value, the P/E ratio reflects to a certain extent investors’ expectations of a company’s future profitability. In the blockchain world, the P/E ratio is the ratio of market value to earnings. It can reflect the expectation of future income and cash flow, one of the tools to measure the efficiency of assets, and it can also be used as an indicator when comparing projects.
About #click to browseThis research report belongs to Mint Ventures' # series scanning series. Compared with the #深研报 series which conducts comprehensive analysis of individual projects, the focus of #Scan series articles is to focus on the development trend of the search, and the horizontal comparison of the growing projects. From the above, we can see the unique dynamics and potential projects in the business.Application-specific: An application that provides access to two or more blockchains, but only for use in that application. The advantage of this kind of application itself is that the code base is small; instead of having a separate instance of the entire application on each blockchain, there are usually more lightweight and modular on each blockchain "Adapter". A blockchain that implements an "adapter" can access all other blockchains it is connected to, so there is a network effect. Their disadvantage is that it is difficult to extend this function to other applications (for example, from lending applications to transaction applications). Specific use cases are Compound Chain and Thorchain, which respectively build independent blockchains dedicated to cross-chain lending and transactions.
Generalized: A protocol designed to transmit information across multiple blockchains. Due to its low complexity, this design enjoys a strong network effect-a single integration of the project allows it to access the entire ecosystem within the bridge. The disadvantage is that some designs usually trade-off between security and decentralization to achieve this scalability effect. This may have complex and unexpected consequences for the ecosystem. One of the use cases is IBC, which is used to send information in two heterogeneous chains (with a guarantee of finality).In addition, according to the mechanism used to verify cross-chain transactions, there are roughly three types of bridge designs:Type 1: External validators & Federations (External validators & Federations)This type of bridging scheme usually has a group of verifiers that monitor the "mailbox" addresses on the source chain and perform operations on the target chain based on consensus. Asset transfer usually works like this: lock assets on the "mailbox", and then mint the same amount of assets on the target chain. These validators usually deposit separate tokens as collateral to ensure the security of the network.
Type 2: Light clients & RelaysParticipants monitor events on the source chain and generate encrypted packaging proofs about past events recorded on the chain. These proofs will be forwarded to the contract on the target chain (such as "light client") along with the block header, and then verify whether an event is recorded, and perform operations after verification. This design mechanism requires some participants to "relay" the block headers and proofs. Although users can "self-relay" transactions, there is indeed an active assumption that the relay will continue to forward data. This is a relatively secure bridging design because it guarantees the effective delivery of trustlessness without trusting intermediate entities. But it is also resource-intensive, because developers must build a new smart contract on each new target chain to parse the source chain's state proof; the verification process itself requires a large amount of gas.
Type 3: Liquidity networksThis is similar to a peer-to-peer network, where each node acts as a "router", holding a "library" of source and target chain assets. These networks usually take advantage of the security of the underlying blockchain; through the use of locking and dispute mechanisms, it can be ensured that routers will not steal users' funds. Because of this, a liquid network like Connext may be a safer choice for users who transfer large amounts of value. In addition, this type of bridge may be most suitable for cross-chain asset transfer, because the assets provided by the router are the original assets of the target chain, rather than derivative assets that cannot be completely replaced by each other.It should be noted that any given bridge above is a two-way communication channel. There may be independent models in each channel, so this classification cannot accurately represent mixed models such as Gravity, Interlay, and tBTC. Because they all have light clients in one direction and validator nodes in the other direction.In addition, the design of a bridge can be roughly evaluated based on the following factors:
Security: Trust and liveness assumptions, tolerance for malicious behavior, security and reflexivity of user funds.Speed: The delay time of transaction completion, and the guarantee of final certainty. There is usually a trade-off between speed and safety.Connectivity: The choice of target chains for users and developers, and the different difficulty levels of integrating additional target chains.Capital efficiency: economic mechanism, which sets the transaction cost of capital and asset transfer required to ensure the security of the system.
Statefulness: The ability to transfer specific assets, more complex states, and/or perform cross-chain contract calls.In summary, the trade-offs of these three design mechanisms can be evaluated from the perspective of the following figure:
In addition, security is a scope, we can roughly divide it into the following categories:Trust-less: The security of the bridge is bound to the underlying blockchain it bridges. Unless the underlying blockchain is attacked by consensus-level attacks, users' funds will not be lost or stolen. In other words, this is not complete trustlessness, because all the economic, engineering, and cryptographic components of these systems contain trust assumptions (for example, there are no loopholes in the code).
Insured (Insured): Attackers can steal user funds, but they may be unprofitable in doing so. Because they need to provide collateral to participate in the network, and they will be punished for wrongdoing and malicious behavior. If the user's funds are lost, the agreement will compensate the user by confiscation of the attacker's collateral.Bonded (Bonded): Similar to the insurance model (for example, the economic benefits of participants are closely related to their behavior), except that the user's collateral is forfeited due to his mistakes and malicious behavior. The type of collateral is important for both the insurance and the mortgage model; endogenous collateral (protocol tokens as collateral) is more risky, because if the bridge fails, the value of the token is also likely to collapse, which further reduces Security guarantee for bridging.Trusted: Participants do not need to mortgage assets, and users cannot retrieve assets when the system fails or commits malicious behavior. Therefore, security mainly depends on the reputation of the bridge operator."External validators and federalism" are generally better in terms of state and connectivity because they can trigger transactions, store data, and allow data to interact with any number of target chains. However, this comes at the cost of security, because by definition, users rely on the security of the bridge rather than the source or target chain. Although most of the current external validator mechanisms are based on trust models, some require collateralized assets, and a subset of assets is used to insure end users. Unfortunately, their insurance mechanisms are usually reflexive. If the agreement token is used as collateral, it is assumed that the value of the token is sufficient to compensate the user's loss. In addition, if the mortgage asset is different from the insurance asset, it will also depend on the price flow of the oracle, so the security of the bridge will be downgraded to that of the oracle. If a trust model is not required, these bridges are also the least capital efficient, because they promote economic throughput and also need to scale up the scale of collateral."Light client and relay" is also better in terms of state, because the block header relay system can transmit any type of data. Although there are liveness assumptions due to the need for repeaters to transmit information, they are also very safe because they do not require additional trust assumptions. At the same time, they are the most capital efficient bridges because there is no need to lock any assets. However, these advantages come at the expense of connectivity. Every time a pair of chains is connected, the developer must deploy a new light client smart contract on the source chain and the target chain. The complexity of the contract is between O(LogN) and O(N) (the reason is between this The scope is because it is relatively easy to add chain support using the same consensus algorithm). There is also a significant speed flaw in the optimistic model that relies on fraud proofs, which may increase the delay to 4 hours."Liquidity networks" are strong in terms of security and speed because they are locally verified systems (that is, global consensus is not required). They are also more capital efficient than the external validator mechanism of the mortgage/insurance mechanism, because capital efficiency is related to transaction flow/volume, rather than security. For example, assuming that the transaction flows of the two chains are equal, and given a built-in rebalancing mechanism, the liquidity network can contribute to an arbitrarily large economic throughput.
The trade-off lies in the state, because although the call data can be transmitted, its function is limited. For example, they can interact with data across chains, where the receiver has the right to interact based on the provided data (for example, using the signature information from the sender to call a smart contract), but there is no "owner" of the data for the transmission or the transmission belongs to Generalized state data (such as minting representative tokens) is not helpful.Building a strong cross-chain bridge is a difficult problem in distributed systems. Although there have been many attempts in this field, there are still some problems to be solved:
Finality & rollbacks: In a chain with probabilistic finality, how does bridging deal with block reorganization and time thief attacks? For example, if any chain has experienced a state rollback, what will happen to users who send themselves from Polkadot to Ethereum?NFT transfers & provenance: How can bridges trace the provenance of NFT across multiple chains? For example, if there is an NFT that has transacted in multiple markets of Ethereum, Flow, and Solana, how are all these transactions and owners recorded?
Stress testing: In the case of chain congestion or protocol and network level attacks, how will various bridge designs respond?Although bridging unlocks more innovation possibilities for the blockchain ecosystem, if the team takes shortcuts in R&D, it may also bring great risks. The Poly Network cross-chain attack event has shown us the potential economic loss scale of vulnerabilities and attacks, and I estimate that there will be more large-scale attacks in the future. Although for bridge builders, the current network is highly fragmented and competition is fierce. But each team should be highly self-disciplined and prioritize security rather than release speed.
Although the ultimate ideal state is to build a "isomorphic bridge" shared by all things, the reality is that there is probably no single "best" bridge design. Different types of bridges will be suitable for different specific applications (such as asset transfer, contract invocation, token minting, etc.).In addition, the best bridge should be the most secure, connectable, fast, capital efficient, cost-effective, and censorship-resistant. If we want to realize the vision of the "blockchain internet", these attributes need to be maximized by us.So far, we have not constructed the optimal bridge. There are several interesting research directions for all bridging types:Reducing the cost of block header verification: The cost of block header verification for light clients is very high. If this problem can be solved, it will bring us closer to achieving fully universal and trustless interoperability. An interesting design is to bridge to L2 to reduce these costs. For example, implement the Tendermint light client on zkSync.
Shift from a trust-based model to a mortgage model: Although the capital efficiency of mortgage verifiers is much lower, the security of "social contracts" is not enough to protect billions of dollars in user funds. In addition, the fancy threshold signature mechanism does not reduce trust; this group of signers still belongs to a trusted third party. Without collateral, users actually hand over their assets to an external custodian.Change from a mortgage model to an insurance model: Loss of assets is the last thing users want to encounter. Although verifiers and repeaters of mortgage assets can prevent malicious behavior to a certain extent, the agreement should go further and directly use the confiscated funds to compensate users.
Expanding the liquidity of the liquidity network: The "liquidity network" can be said to be the fastest bridge for asset transfer, and there are some interesting design trade-offs between trust and liquidity. For example, the liquidity network may be able to use the mortgage verifier model to outsource capital supply, where routing may also be a threshold multi-signature with mortgage liquidity.Bridge aggregation: Although the use of bridges may follow the law of exponential for a specific asset, an aggregator like Li Finance can improve the experience of developers and end users.
Nowadays, many GameFi projects continue to emerge, and provide a variety of participation methods and play-to-earn and pledge functions. So, how to judge which projects can be held for a long time and can add value? How to find potential NFT agreements?The calculation of agreement income is the focus of value investment.
First of all, let's take a look at what is the agreement income? What is the difference with income?Let me talk about the definition of revenue. Revenue measures the return of all participants, that is, the total cost paid to the contract supplier. For example, the fees paid to liquidity providers in AMM, the transaction fees of decentralized exchanges, and the amount of interest on the lending platform in DeFi. Revenue is obtained by charging a rate to the total flow of the agreement. Simply put, revenue refers to the total fees paid by end users of blockchain or decentralized applications. These revenues will eventually be distributed to token holders, liquidity holders and protocol libraries.GMV (Gross merchandise volume) refers to the total flow of the agreement, which represents the transaction volume of the blockchain or the transaction volume and borrowing volume of decentralized applications. For decentralized exchanges, GMV is the total transaction volume, and for lending agreements, GMV is the total borrowing volume.The fee rate is the fee charged to GMV, which can be the transaction fee of the blockchain, the transaction fee of Dapp, or the interest rate of the loan.
Income calculation formula:GMV * Take Rate = Revenue
Total transaction volume * rate = project revenue (total fees paid)The total revenue is distributed between the agreement and its Token holders and supplier participants (miners/validators, liquidity providers, lenders, etc.). For early-stage projects, 100% of the revenue is usually distributed directly to supplier participants. In the long run, the revenue sharing model will be more diversified, and the agreement and its owners can also get a share of the total revenue.
Agreement revenue represents the cash flow of the agreement. The agreement collects costs from users and is calculated as a percentage of total revenue.The difference between agreement income and income